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ReviewMind Blindness
and the Brain in Autism
prevalence of autism spectrum disorders is now esti-
mated at between 0.3% and 0.7%. The increase of diag-
nosed cases in recent years can be accounted for by
Uta Frith
UCL Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience
17 Queen Square
London WC1N 3AR increased awareness of the disorder in all its variants
and the use of wider diagnostic criteria (Fombonne,United Kingdom
1999). The male to female ratio is approximately 3 to 1,
becoming more extreme with higher levels of ability.
Individuals with autistic spectrum disorder have strik-Experimental evidence shows that the inability to attri-
ing limitations in social relatedness and in the ability tobute mental states, such as desires and beliefs, to
communicate verbally and nonverbally. They are oftenself and others (mentalizing) explains the social and
aloof in childhood and remain egocentric even after hav-communication impairments of individuals with au-
ing learned the basic rules of social interaction. Theytism. Brain imaging studies in normal volunteers high-
may have no speech, or very delayed speech, and evenlight a circumscribed network that is active during
those who become verbally fluent still have problems inmentalizing and links medial prefrontal regions with
comprehension. Individuals with autism also have otherposterior superior temporal sulcus and temporal
characteristic features, such as restricted interests, mo-poles. The brain abnormality that results in mentalizing
tor stereotypies, and obsessive tendencies. They canfailure in autism may involve weak connections be-
have excellent rote memory and may possess savanttween components of this system.
skills.
Autism is a disorder that affects many cognitive func-
In this review, I will discuss a productive and successful, tions; however, it does not imply a global information
though still controversial, theory of autism. This theory processing deficiency (Scheuffgen et al., 2000). While
attempts to explain the social and communication failure the hallmark of the disorder is a failure of social commu-
that is the very core of autistic disorder. The cognitive nication, this does not imply a global lack of social abil-
cause for this failure is assumed to be “mind blindness.” ity. Rather, autism appears to be caused by one or more
This concept presupposes that normal individuals have specific, i.e., circumscribed, cognitive deficits. At the
the capacity to “mind read,” that is, to attribute mental same time, such modular deficits would have develop-
states to self and other. This is referred to as the “theory mental repercussions on general adaptive functioning
of mind” or “mentalizing.” The theory assumes that this (Frith and Happe´, 1998). This is in line with current ideas
capacity, far from being the product of complex logical about innate domain-specific mechanisms with a cir-
inference, rests on a dedicated neurocognitive mecha- cumscribed basis in the brain (for a discussion of current
nism. I will review the evidence that this mechanism is theories see Black, 1998). Arguably the most relevant
impaired in both severe and mild forms of autism. Its of these deficits in the origin of autism is a subtle but
putative neural basis can give clues to the underlying devastating deficit in human social insight, on which
brain abnormalities in autism. this review will focus. This can be referred to as the
mind blindness hypothesis (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995).
The Autism Spectrum
It is now widely agreed that autism is a neurodevelop- Mind Reading and Mind Blindness
mental disorder (for reviews see Bailey et al., 1996; Individuals with autistic disorder have occasionally
Happe´ and Frith, 1996; Lord et al., 2000). Autism persists commented on what they perceive as an unfathomable
throughout life. It varies in degree of severity and can yet ubiquitous ability of other people to “mind read”
occur at all levels of ability, so that it is now generally during ordinary social interactions. Normal people in-
assumed that there is a spectrum of autistic disorders. deed behave as if they have an implicit theory of mind,
Asperger syndrome, a milder variant, and currently dis- and this allows them to explain and predict others’ be-
tinguished from other forms of autism by the lack of havior in terms of their presumed thoughts and feelings.
linguistic or cognitive delay, is often not diagnosed until To give an example: you might observe me in my office
late childhood or even adulthood. The diagnosis of autis- bent over a filing cabinet drawer pulling out and putting
tic disorder is based on behavioral criteria set out in back folders. You would make sense of this behavior
diagnostic handbooks such as the ICD-10 (World Health by mentalizing, that is, automatically recognizing that I
Organization, 1992) and DSM-IV (American Psychiatric am looking for a paper that I believe is in one of the
Association, 2000). Autism was first identified and la- folders and that I wish to retrieve. You would think this
beled by Kanner (1943) and Asperger (1944). even if you knew that the paper was not there. To explain
The causes of autism are largely genetic (see Maes- my behavior, it is immaterial whether the missing file is
trini et al., 2000, for a review of susceptibility genes). in the cabinet or really somewhere else. Suppose that
There is no known medical treatment, but well-struc- you say to me “Try Debbie’s desk,” and I respond with “I
tured behavioral treatments have beneficial effects, and might have known.” Without mentalizing, this everyday
high levels of compensatory learning can occur. The exchange would seem like complete non sequiturs. Fur-
ther, without mentalizing, you might come up with an
outlandish interpretation of what I was doing—perhapsCorrespondence: u.frith@ucl.ac.uk
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practicing back bending and finger moving? The impor- specific social environment will tune it up and get it into
action. The main purpose of an innate start-up mecha-tant point of the example is that for an instantaneous
interpretation of ordinary behavior, we automatically nism is that it should lead to fast learning about the
properties of its domain, with culture shaping the con-take account of the mental state of people, their desires,
and their beliefs. tent of the knowledge that is acquired. The development
of the social brain involves many other processes as
well, such as the perception of faces, voices, and move-The Cognitive Basis of Mind Reading
ments of conspecifics, and these may well be prerequi-Leslie (1987) proposed that the ability to represent men-
sites for the development of mentalizing.tal states is based on a dedicated cognitive mechanism.
Sensitivity and learning about the inner states ofThis mechanism includes a “decoupler” and an “expres-
agents starts early and proceeds rapidly. Early signs ofsion raiser” and transforms primary representations (im-
such sensitivity are seen in the phenomenon of sharedpressions of the physical world) into secondary repre-
attention (Carpenter et al., 1998). Children in the firstsentations. These are “decoupled” from reality and
year of life automatically follow another person’s gaze,raised into expressions “in quotes.” They can thus be
seemingly attending to the other person’s focus of inter-attached to an agent’s intentional stance; for example,
est. Shared attention is accompanied by other signsagent A believes, desires, etc., that “x is the case.” Men-
of mentalizing. For instance, referential looking, wheretalizing can thus be conceived of as representing an
children check the mother’s expressive attitude towardagent’s propositional attitude to states in the world, thus
a novel object before approaching or avoiding it (Repa-keeping apart someone’s attitude to states in the world
choli, 1998). The ability to imitate complex and arbitraryand actual states in the world. This is why children are
but intentional actions of others—as opposed to theirnot confused when their mother holds a banana to her
accidental actions—is another sign of the inexorableface and pretends it is a telephone.
progress of mentalizing ability and is achieved in theAccording to Leslie (1987), the first florid manifestation
middle of the second year of life (Meltzoff, 1995).of the ability to mentalize is seen in the young child’s
Young children aged 2–3 years learn to understandenjoyment of pretence, from around 18 months. Here
and use mental state verbs (want, know, pretend) beforethe child acts as if realizing that when mother is using
they learn color names (Bretherton, 1992). Mentalizinga banana as a telephone, she is taking a propositional
ability is also important as a facilitator of learning inattitude to a particular object, which does not interfere
other domains. For instance, according to Bloom (2000),with the child’s learning about real telephones and real
mentalizing has a critical function in enabling childrenbananas. The implications of this proposal are radical:
to learn the meanings of words. Thus, children don’ta neural system is required that supports the processing
learn words by mere association of word sound andof specific information in relation to agents and is not
object in view. Such association is inherently ambiguoustied to a particular modality. If there is such a system
and error prone, as speaker and listener may look atin the normal case, then we can envisage this system
different objects. Instead, children learn by tracking thebeing dysfunctional from birth, resulting in a difficulty
speaker’s referential intention, for example, by takingwith the intentional stance. This difficulty would result
into account the speaker’s gaze (Baldwin et al. 1996).in mind blindness.
The effortless ease with which children as young as 5The development of this radical proposal as a neuro-
(and usually before 8 years of age) acquire advancedcognitive theory owed much to the timely coincidence
concepts such as false belief, deception, white lie, andof some highly novel ideas and experiments in the late
double bluff is remarkable.1970s and early 1980s. They concerned the need to
explain understanding of mental states, such as beliefs,
in the chimpanzee (Premack and Woodruff, 1978) and Experimental Studies of Mentalizing Failure
in young children (Wimmer and Perner, 1983). Likewise, in Autism
there was the need to explain the spontaneous enjoy- The mind blindness theory predicts that the milestones
ment of make believe in infancy (Leslie, 1987). At the of the normal development of mentalizing should be
same time, it had been documented that young children absent at the appropriate age in young children with
with autism lacked spontaneous make-believe play autism. In particular, they should fail to follow another
(Wing and Gould, 1979). New questions could now be person’s gaze, fail to point at or show objects of inter-
asked: how did understanding of mental states such as est—both signs of shared attention—and fail to under-
belief and pretense evolve? How does it develop in the stand make-believe play. Baron-Cohen et al. (1996)
normal child? What is different in the brain of individuals looked for these signs in a large prospective population-
with autism that impairs this development? based study of infants aged 18 months. At age 3 years,
when a firm diagnosis of autism can be made, the co-
occurrence of these early signs was found to predictThe Development of Mentalizing
in the Normal Child the diagnosis remarkably well. Taken together, these
three signs of impaired mentalizing in early life provedIf there is a dedicated mechanism for mentalizing, incor-
porating such functions as a “decoupler” and an “ex- reliable enough to serve as a first infant screening test
for autism (Baird et al., 2000). It is possible that evenpression raiser,” when does it come into play and how
does it enable learning? Clearly, a newborn child does some preconditions for the development of mentalizing
may be absent. Attentional preferences for humannot possess fully functioning mentalizing ability. Never-
theless, the assumption is that the brain comes agents, their faces, their voices, and their movements,
which are probably important triggers for the mentaliz-equipped with a start-up kit, and that a normal species-
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Figure 1. Scenario of Sally-Ann Task
With kind permission from the artist, Axel
Scheffler.
ing mechanism, may be lacking in autism. For instance, nally devised by Wimmer and Perner (1983), who
showed that normally developing children aged 4 andpreschool children with autism did not show a prefer-
ence for speech over nonspeech stimuli as do other above passed this test.
In the Sally-Ann task, shown in Figure 1, the followingchildren (Klin, 1991). Nor do older children show a spon-
taneous preference for facial expressions over other scenario is enacted either with two dolls or two real
people: Sally has a basket and Anne has a box. Sallysalient stimuli, such as hats (Hobson, 1993). Face recog-
nition difficulties are common throughout the autism puts a marble into her basket, and then she goes out
for a walk. While she is outside, naughty Anne takes thespectrum, perhaps because of a lack of social interest
early in life. In a neuroimaging study, Schultz et al. (2000) marble from the basket and puts it into her own box.
Now Sally comes back from her walk and wants to playfound that brain activation patterns in adults with autism
did not distinguish between faces and objects, in con- with her marble. Where will she look for the marble? The
answer seems obvious to a 4 year old child: Sally willtrast to normal adults.
The mind blindness hypothesis was originally pro- look inside her basket. Why? Because that is where
Sally thinks it is. The marble is really in Anne’s box, butposed and tested by Baron-Cohen et al. (1985, 1986).
The argument was that if the social impairment in autism Sally doesn’t know this. She was not there when Anne
transferred the marble. Children with autism, with a men-arises from a failure of the mentalizing mechanism as
conceptualized by Leslie (1987), then children with au- tal age of 4 years and above, had difficulty with this
task. Unlike normally developing children, and unliketism should be unable to represent mental states such
as beliefs. They should be unable to understand and children with Down syndrome, they indicated that Sally
would look in Anne’s box.predict behavior in terms of someone’s belief even when
having achieved the appropriate level of verbal and cog- The inability of children with autism to understand
false belief tasks at the appropriate age has been con-nitive development. The test was a false belief task origi-
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a photograph. As illustrated in Figure 3, children were
shown a teddy bear sitting on a chair. A Polaroid photo-
graph was taken of the scene. The photo was put aside,
and the teddy bear was moved to a bed. The critical
question was whether the invisible photo showed the
teddy bear on the bed or on the chair. The answer is
obviously, “on the chair.” Compare this to the scenario
in the Sally-Anne task, where the question was whether
the invisible belief in Sally’s mind was that the marble
was in the basket or in the box. A belief can become
false, while still being held as true in the person’s mind.
Just so, a photograph can become out of date, still
depicting an old scene. The results of a comparison of
the two experiments by Leslie and Thaiss (1992) are
shown in Figure 4. As predicted by the theory, under-
Figure 2. Relationships Between Verbal Ability and Success on standing of false photographs, but not understanding
False Belief Tasks of false beliefs, was well within the comprehension of
Redrawn from Happe´’s meta-analysis of data from 70 children with children with autism. In the case of the normally devel-
autism, 34 children with mental retardation, and 70 normally devel- oping children, the situation was if anything the reverse:
oping children, showing the cumulative likelihood of passing false
they found it easier to answer questions about Sally’sbelief tasks with increasing verbal mental age.
belief than questions about the photograph. This sug-With kind permission from the author and the publishers of Child
gests that the Sally-Ann task requires a measure of in-Development (Blackwell).
hibitory capacity, and that normally developing children
under the age of 4 struggle with the task because of
domain-general limitations (e.g., inhibitory failure, sa-firmed subsequently in a number of studies (see chap-
lience of reality), while children with autism fail due toters in Baron-Cohen et al, 1999). Happe´ (1995) showed
specific difficulties in “reading minds.” This experimentthat the verbal mental age of children with autism who
strongly supports the idea that mentalizing rests on aare on the cusp of understanding false belief exceeds
separable, or modular, cognitive mechanism.that of normally developing children by 4 or more years.
Thus, as shown in Figure 2, a verbal mental age of 8
Mind Blindness Explains the Social Communicationand above appears to be necessary to pass standard
Impairments in Autismfalse belief tests in the case of autism, but only about
The mind blindness hypothesis is an example of a partic-4 in the case of normal development.
ular model of developmental disorders. The claim of this
model is that a single circumscribed cognitive deficit
can result in a variety of symptoms that may superficiallyImplications of Success and Failure
on False Belief Tasks look unrelated and that span a wide range of severity
(Frith et al., 1991). Thus, a deficit in mentalizing canFalse belief tasks are deceptively simple, but they tap
many different abilities and can be solved in different account parsimoniously for the core impairments in so-
cialization, communication, and imagination that char-ways. The mind blindness hypothesis is often misunder-
stood as meaning that people with autism do not pos- acterize the autism spectrum. At the same time, it is
specific enough to predict unimpaired function in othersess an explicit theory of mind and never can possess
such a theory. Instead, the hypothesis is about the fail- domains, assuming there were no additional cognitive
deficits. In fact, there are other deficits.ure of the mentalizing start-up mechanism, not about a
“theory.” Despite a dysfunctional start-up mechanism, The mind blindness hypothesis has never claimed to
account for the presence of repetitive behavior and nar-able individuals with autism, and especially those with
Asperger syndrome, can come to understand mental row obsessively pursued interests in autism. It cannot
account for motor problems, perceptual processingstates through compensatory learning. However, not
only do they acquire this understanding late, but they anomalies, or the commonly found superior rote memory
skills. Other theories address these features (Russell,are slow and error prone on more advanced mentalizing
tasks. 1998; Happe´, 1999). However, mind blindness may be
able to explain some of the language abnormalities. InIf success on false belief tasks is not always easy
to interpret, neither is failure. The mentalizing deficit autism, muteness, language delay, echoing of speech,
and idiosyncratic use of language are highly typical fea-hypothesis predicts failure on the Sally-Anne and similar
tasks, but there are many other reasons for failure. For tures. Even in cases of age-appropriate or precocious
appearance of language, a defining feature of Aspergerinstance, the Sally-Anne test requires working memory
and the ability to inhibit reality-oriented responses, i.e., disorder, parental observations suggest that the first
words were often unusual and that vocabulary acquisi-pointing to the place where the object really is. For
a convincing demonstration, it is necessary to show tion was different from that in normally developing chil-
dren. To investigate the apparently odd pattern of wordsuccess on a task that is in every respect the same but
that does not involve thinking about mental states. learning Baron-Cohen et al. (1997) used the ingenious
discrepant looking paradigm, where speaker and lis-An example of such a task uses a scenario in which
the critical question concerned the pictorial content of tener attend to different objects while the speaker utters
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Figure 3. Scenario of False Photograph Task
With kind permission from the artist, Axel
Scheffler.
a new word. They demonstrated that children with au- who can make the appropriate allowances for mind
blindness can still be a rich source of experience andtism made errors in mapping the word to the object that
they happened to be looking at at the time, showing learning.
Alternative views of the social impairment in autismmere association learning. Control children matched for
mental age did not make such errors, but instead have often focused on emotional dysfunction. Studies
by Hobson (1993) and Sigman and colleagues (see Sig-mapped the word to the object that the speaker was
looking at. To be guided by the speaker’s referential man and Capps, 1997) suggest that children with autism
are less responsive to the emotions displayed by others.intention is a sign of mentalizing, and its absence in
autism goes some way toward explaining the unusual For instance, they show little concern when an adult
cries out in pain, pretending to be hurt, except whendevelopment of language in autism.
What of those individuals without the benefit of a start- their attention was strongly engaged. On the other hand,
contrary to popular belief, failure of bonding or attach-up mechanism, who learn about mental states through
conscious effort? Slow learning based on forming asso- ment does not appear to be a distinguishing character-
istic of autism in early childhood. Attachment wouldciations between behavior and outcomes will allow the
gradual acquisition of mental state concepts. In every- appear to be one of those components of social cogni-
tion that are dissociable from mentalizing. It is possibleday life, many individuals with autistic disorder show
that they have learned the rules of social convention, that responsiveness to specific emotions is another dis-
sociable social component.but they lack the intuition to discern situations where
these rules become inappropriate and are thrown by Impaired emotional processing may be secondary to
mind blindness. Experimental studies (Baron-Cohen etplayfulness and irony. However, even without the intu-
itive ability to mentalize, social interaction with others al., 1997; Adolphs et al., 2001) suggest that individuals
Neuron
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Figure 5. Schematic Representation of Areas in the Medial Prefron-
tal Cortex Activated by Mentalizing and Related Tasks
Average peak activations during mentalizing are represented by
letters for the following studies: a, Goel et al., (1995); b, Fletcher et al.,
(1995); c, Brunet et al., (2000); d, Vogeley et al., (2001); e, Gallagher et
Figure 4. Success and Failure of False Belief and False Photograph al., (2000); and f, Castelli et al., (2000). These peaks, which are very
Tasks medial, cluster in the most anterior part of the of paracingulate
Redrawn from the results of an experiment by Leslie and Thaiss of cortex, a region on the border between anterior cingulate and medial
20 normally developing children with a mean age of 4 years and 15 prefrontal cortex, with a range of x values from6 to2 on average
children with autism with a mean age of 12 years. Here passing two (for y and z values, see figure). The brain volume indicated by the
false belief tasks, one of them illustrated in Figure 1, was compared peak activations is circumscribed by a space of 8  18  24 mm.
with passing two false photograph tasks, one of them illustrated in The same region was also activated in tasks that required subjects
Figure 3. to report on their own mental states as indicated by the tips of
With kind permission from the authors and the publishers of Cogni- arrows. The self-reported inner states have included actions (Carter
tion (Elsevier). et al., 1998), pain (Rainville et al., 1997), thoughts (McGuire et al.,
1996), emotions aroused by pictures (Lane et al., 1997), and sensa-
tions experienced during tickling (Blakemore et al., 1998).
with autism are impaired when having to interpret com-
plex social emotions from faces rather than simple basic
show the location of the average peak activations in theemotions. Individuals on the severe extreme of the au-
six studies quoted above. The figures also show peaktism spectrum may never make deliberate eye contact
activations in these same regions obtained in otherand perhaps may not distinguish between biological
highly relevant imaging studies, which can inform usagents and mechanical objects. This severe form of the
about the function of these regions and how they mightcondition is characterized by a degree of social detach-
contribute to the ability to mentalize.ment that exists over and above mind blindness. How-
Why these particular regions and what do they haveever, global asocial behavior is not the rule in autism
in common? Clearly, the system identified is tailor-madespectrum disorders.
Functional Brain Imaging and the Neural
Substrate of Mentalizing
As yet, only a few studies have investigated the neuro-
physiological substrate of mentalizing, This is partly due
to the difficulties in designing suitable mentalizing tasks
with closely matched control tasks (i.e., tasks that differ
only in the requirement to mentalize). Existing studies
of normal volunteers have used contrasting conditions
with stories (Fletcher et al. 1995; Gallagher et al. 2000;
Vogeley et al. 2001), cartoons (Gallagher et al. 2000),
picture sequences (Brunet et al., 2000), and animated
geometric shapes (Castelli et al. 2000). In all these stud-
ies, a network of brain regions was identified that was
Figure 6. Schematic Representation of Areas in the Temporo-Pari-
consistently active during mentalizing over and above etal Region Activated by Mentalizing and Related Tasks
the specific demands of the respective tasks. This (es-
The average peaks of activation in mentalizing studies are indicated
sentially bilateral) network appears to be the distinctive by letters a–f (for key see legend to Figure 5). The activations are
signature of mentalizing. The peaks of activation are in bilateral, with x values ranging from 41 to 59, but most studies
find greater activations in the right hemisphere, as illustrated in the(1) the medial prefrontal cortex, in particular, the most
diagram. Arrows point to the average peak activation of two studiesanterior part of paracingulate cortex, a region on the
involving eye gaze (Wicker et al., 1998; Hoffman and Haxby, 2000)border between anterior cingulate and medial prefrontal
and to the average peak activation obtained in four studies of biolog-cortex (very medial); (2) the temporal-parietal junction
ical motion (Puce et al., 1998; Bonda et al., 1996; Calvert et al., 1997;
at the top of the superior temporal gyrus (stronger on Grezes et al., 1999). A third thicker arrow refers to the area V5/MT
the right); and (3) the temporal poles adjacent to the which processes pure motion. This region is activated by all kinds
of motion, whether or not it is biological.amygdala (somewhat stronger on the left). Figures 5–7
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ences were shown in brain activation. The Asperger
group showed less activation in the critical medial pre-
frontal region, while their peak activation was in a more
ventral region of frontal cortex.
In an fMRI study, Baron-Cohen et al. (1999) compared
a group of six able individuals with autism with a group
of twelve controls. Subjects were asked to judge inner
states of people from photographs of the eye region,
deciding which of two words best described their men-
tal/emotional state. The contrast was to judge whether
the photo was that of a male or a female. Compared to
the control group, people with autism demonstrated less
extensive activation in frontal regions and no activationFigure 7. Schematic Representation of Areas in the Peri-Amygda-
in the amygdala.loid Cortex at the Temporal Poles Activated by Mentalizing Tasks
Castelli et al. (unpublished data) showed silent anima-The average peaks of activation in mentalizing studies are indicated
by letters a–f (for key see legend to Figure 5). The activations are tions to ten able adults of normal intelligence with autis-
bilateral, with x values ranging from 36 to 58, but most studies tic disorder and to ten normal adults. The animations
find greater activations in the left hemisphere, as illustrated in the featured two triangles moving about on a screen [for
diagram. The peak activation for mentalizing obtained by Baron
examples see http://www.icn.ucl .ac.uk/groups/UF/Cohen et al. (1999), using an eye gaze interpretation paradigm, is
Research/animations.html]. In one condition they werein the amygdala, which is not represented in this figure as it lies in
scripted to elicit attribution of mental states (e.g., coax-a region some 20 mm more medial.
ing, mocking). In another condition, the triangles moved
randomly. This was the contrast that was used to high-
light the mentalizing system. During mentalizing, thefor processing the intentions of biological agents. As
autism group showed less activation than the controlsFigure 5 shows, the same space of the medial frontal
in the three previously identified brain regions. However,region is also activated by tasks that imply awareness
they showed identical activation during mentalizing inof the self. As Figure 6 shows, the superior temporal
one additional region, the occipital gyrus. The activationsulcus, mainly on the right, is also activated by tasks that
of this region suggests that both groups devoted morerequire detection of biological agents. Further studies
intensive visual analysis to the critical animations. How-suggest that this is not confined to biological motion in
ever, connectivity between the occipital and temporo-the visual modality. Activations are shown with such
parietal regions was weaker in the autism group than indiverse stimuli as faces (Kesler-West et al., 2001),
the controls. This finding provides a clue to a possiblespeech (Belin et al., 2000), multimodal cues (Kawashima
reason for mind blindness. The underactivation of theet al., 1999), and contextual cues to intention (Toni et
system may be due to a bottleneck for interactive influ-al., 2001). Other studies suggest that the temporal poles,
ences between lower and higher order perceptual pro-stronger on the left, are also activated when facts about
cessing areas. These findings are still preliminary butother agents and the self are remembered, e.g., familiar
support the notion of a dysfunction in the specific neuralfaces and scenes (Nakamura et al., 2000), and familiar
substrate for mentalizing in autism.emotionally laden stimuli in different modalities (Dolan
et al., 2000).
Unfortunately, none of the studies to date throws light Evidence from Anatomical Studies
on how a link between all three regions might result in of the Brain in Autism
mentalizing. This ability is clearly more than the sum of Can mentalizing failure in autism be linked to some
its parts. If mentalizing crucially involves “decoupling” structural abnormality in one or more of the regions of
to keep apart real states of affairs and mental states the mentalizing system? Some preliminary evidence for
(Leslie, 1987), then what neurophysiological process such a possibility exists. Abell et al. (1999) reported
might underpin it? One key approach to this problem is structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) data on
the comparative study of brain physiology in autism. If 15 high-functioning individuals with autistic disorder. A
mentalizing is dysfunctional in autism, then the associ- voxel-based whole brain analysis identified gray matter
ated brain abnormality should point us in the right di- differences relative to 15 age- and IQ-matched controls
rection. in a distributed system possibly centered on the amyg-
dala. Decreases of gray matter were found in anterior
parts of this system, in particular the paracingulate sul-Evidence from Functional Brain Imaging
of Mentalizing in Autism cus and inferior frontal gyrus. The paracingulate region
was extremely close to the region that was found to beOnly three studies to date have explicitly studied individ-
uals with autism on mentalizing tasks. Happe´ et al. used less active in individuals with autistic disorder in the
Happe´ et al. (1996) and Castelli et al. (unpublished data)a story paradigm in a PET study, comparing six normal
adults with five able adults with Asperger syndrome. imaging studies. Increases in gray matter were also
found in the posterior parts, that is, the peri-amygdaloidSubjects were scanned while reading stories and an-
swering questions about complex mental states or non- cortex and the middle temporal and inferior temporal
gyrus. Increases in cerebellar structures were alsomental inferences, against a baseline of reading and
remembering unconnected sentences. While both types found. Another structural MRI study (Howard et al. 2000),
using volumetric measures, also found an enlargementof subjects answered the questions satisfactorily, differ-
Neuron
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in the amygdaloid region in able individuals with autistic left amygdaloid lesion and a diagnosis of Asperger syn-
drome showed severe impairment on large variety ofdisorder. While there are theories of amygdala dysfunc-
tion in autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000; Howard et al., mentalizing tasks (Fine et al., 2001). It would be interest-
ing to study mentalizing performance in patients with2000; Adolphs et al., 2001), the evidence so far suggests
that this region is only one component among several semantic dementia who suffer from lesions in the tempo-
ral pole.that might play a causal role in the origin of mind
blindness. The neuropsychological studies to date suggest that
the medial prefrontal cortex may be necessary for men-There is also evidence from the few existing histoana-
tomical studies of autistic brains for abnormalities in talizing, but it seems unlikely that it is also sufficient.
For lesions in other regions identified as part of thethese particular brain regions. For example, Bauman
and Kemper (1994), in an important series of studies, mentalizing system in brain imaging studies, data are
as yet too sparse. Other lesion cases too could be infor-reported cellular abnormalities in post mortem brains of
individuals with autistic disorder, in particular, reduced mative, in particular in the cerebellum, which has been
found to be active during mentalizing in at least someneuronal cell size and increased cell packing density in
regions of the limbic system comprising the hippocam- of the few extant studies.
In summary, the results from neuropsychological,pal complex, subiculum, entorhinal cortex, amygdala,
mamillary body, medial septal nucleus, and anterior cin- structural, and functional imaging studies to date, to-
gether with findings on cellular abnormalities in autisticgulate. Outside the limbic system, reduced numbers of
Purkinje cells were found in the posterior and inferior brains, provide some converging evidence for the criti-
cal brain abnormalities leading to mind blindness.regions of the cerebellum.
Evidence from Acquired Brain Lesions Preliminary Thoughts on the Evolution
of Mind ReadingGiven that the anterior part of paracingulate cortex, the
superior temporal sulcus at the temporo-parietal junc- The social brain is complex (Brothers, 1997), and very
old, but the mentalizing system appears to be of moretion, and the temporal poles, have been reliably acti-
vated in neuroimaging studies of mentalizing, what can recent origin. Monkeys, who are known for their complex
social lives, are unable to mentalize (Cheney and Sey-we learn from acquired lesions of these areas? We do
not expect to find patients suffering the equivalent of farth, 1990), in contrast to chimpanzees and bonobos,
who appear to have only incipient mentalizing skills butautism. For one thing, the effects of developmental brain
abnormalities would be different from those of acciden- can engage in deception (de Waal, 1992). Mentalizing
adds a new dimension to the repertoire of social interac-tally acquired lesions; for another, there is more to au-
tism than social communication impairment. However, tions. It allows the manipulation of others in particularly
subtle ways and reaches far beyond the ability to manip-we can gain information on whether intact functioning
of these regions is necessary for mentalizing success. ulate their behavior by direct instrumental action. Frith
and Frith (2000) speculated that the brain system dedi-Some studies exist where typical theory of mind tasks
have been used with the appropriate control tasks in cated to the representation of mental states evolved
from the dorsal action system rather than from the ven-patients with brain lesions. Happe´ et al. (2001) showed
that a patient who had undergone stereotactic anterior tral object identification system. They argued that much
of the social intelligence already so well developed incapsulotomy (which severs fronto-thalamic fibers) for
intractable depression was specifically impaired on the monkey could be seen as deriving from the ventral
system. It depends upon complex and sophisticatedmentalizing tasks following surgery. He was reported to
show deterioration in his everyday social behavior. He object recognition: recognition of subtle differences in
emotional expression, recognition of other individuals,also failed cartoon tests and story tests of theory of
mind. Group studies of patients with prefrontal lesions, and recognition of their status and relationships. Men-
talizing, in contrast, required the development of thewhich most probably included the critical medial pre-
frontal region identified in brain imaging studies, also capacity to represent actions, and the goals and inten-
tions of agents implicit in actions performed by agents.show theory of mind deficits on a variety of tasks (Stone
et al., 1998; Channon and Crawford, 2000; Stuss et al., Both goal directed movement and eye gaze of other
agents provide clues to their desires, and the ability to2001). Importantly, the evidence from the patients who
suffer mentalizing failure suggests independence from detect such clues may be a first step in the evolution
necessary for mentalizing. The ability to detect goal di-performance on executive function tasks, which is also
thought to be dependent on frontal lobe function (Rowe rected movements is already found in animals without
even the incipient ability to mentalize. Neuroimaginget al. 2001; Blair and Cipolotti, 2000).
Reports on patients with damage to the superior tem- studies have pinpointed the temporal-parietal junction
at the top of the superior temporal sulcus during bothporal sulcus at the temporo-parietal junction, mainly on
the right, have not so far included mentalizing tasks. the detection of eye gaze and of mentalizing (see Figure
6). What is known about cells in this part of the cortex?However, the right hemisphere stroke patients studied
by Happe´ et al. (1999) with verbal and nonverbal men- In their work with monkeys, Perrett et al. (1989) have
identified cells in the superior temporal sulcus (STS)talizing tasks could well have included such lesions.
These authors found impairments and communication that respond to moving hands and faces but not to the
movement of inanimate objects. Moreover, cells in STS,failure as typically seen in some cases of autism, but
only in their right hemisphere patients, not in their left just as the “mirror neurons” (Gallese et al. 1996) in lateral
inferior frontal regions of the macaque brain (F5), re-hemisphere patients. A study of a patient with congenital
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spond to the observation of specific actions (e.g., a Experimental evidence shows that the typical social
precision grip). Intriguingly, a neuron in anterior cingu- communication impairment of autism can be well ex-
late cortex (close to the area with peak activations in plained by impairment in the mentalizing mechanism.
mentalizing studies [Figure 5]) in a patient undergoing Able individuals with autism spectrum disorders can
neurosurgery was found to respond when the patient with time and practice achieve awareness of mental
received a pinprick and also when he watched pinpricks states by compensatory learning. In normally devel-
to the examiner’s fingers (Hutchison et al. 1999). It is oping children, the mentalizing mechanism allows fast
plausible that mirror mechanisms form an early evolu- learning of socially and culturally transmitted knowl-
tionary link to mentalizing. Speculatively, their function edge, including the meaning of words. Since children
underpins not only the automatic computation of an with autism spectrum disorders can be very intelligent
agent’s goal directed actions, but of an agent’s intention and can learn by other means, the underlying brain ab-
toward the self (prey or predator; friend or foe). normality must be sufficiently specific and circum-
However, the detection of agency still does not get us scribed so as not to compromise general information
anywhere near the ability to mentalize. How and where processing ability. This has implications for a modular
might this task be accomplished by neurons? The me- view of the development of cognitive functions.
dial frontal cortex, in particular the most anterior part
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